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The Effect of the Endangered Species
Act on Housing Construction
By
KATHARINE ROSENBERRY*
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) I provides that fed-
eral agencies must ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of designated plants or animals2 or their designated
critical habitats.3 While it is difficult to estimate, federal agencies are
involved to some degree in over twenty-five percent of new housing
starts.4 Section 7 thus requires federal agencies involved in housing
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. B.A.,' 1965, Northwestern
University; M. Ed., 1966, University of Illinois; 1975, J.D., University of San Diego. The
valuable research assistance of Joanne Birnberg and Mary Vance is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12, 222.23, 227.4 (1980).
3. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.95, 17.96 (1980).
4. It is difficult to obtain complete statistics on new housing starts for several reasons.
First, statistics on federally funded housing starts are not kept in one central location. For
example, statistics on housing starts funded with block grants are kept by the Community
Planning and Development Division of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, while statistics on low-income housing starts are kept by the Management Informa-
tion Systems Division of the same department. Thus, to obtain accurate statistics, one must
first know the federal programs that authorize funding of new housing starts and then the
governmental body that administers each program. The statistics below are thus incom-
plete; they are based only on a sampling of federal programs funding new housing starts.
Second, the loan guarantee statistics are for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD) and the Veterans Administration's (VA) loan guarantee programs
only. While these two programs are the most extensive, they are not the only federal loan
guarantee programs. The statistics are thus once again incomplete.
Finally, one cannot add the number of HUD insured housing units to the number of
VA insured units to arrive at a total number of insured units because a dwelling unit may be
insured under both programs and appear in both HUD and VA statistics. Similarly, a unit
may be both funded and insured by HUD and again appear twice.
In fiscal year 1980, HUD funded 101,054 housing starts under the § 8 program, see 42
U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979), 23,380 starts under the traditional public housing
program, 10,676 under the Urban Development Action Grant Program, and 23,160 under
the § 202 program, for a total of 158,270 units or approximately ten percent of the new
housing starts for 1980. Approximately nine percent of the new housing starts in fiscal years
1978 and 1979 were funded in ,this manner.
Privately-owned housing unit starts under a HUD loan guarantee program totaled
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construction to ensure that construction is not likely to jeopardize des-
ignated species.
5
The published opinions discussing section 7 have considered the
sale of federal leases, 6 rules promulgated by federal agencies, 7 and fed-
eral public works projects.8 Housing construction has not been the sub-
ject of any reported decision under section 7, despite housing
construction's great potential for destroying native flora and fauna.
Consequently, the courts have not yet determined the degree of federal
involvement in the construction of housing units necessary to invoke
ESA.
This Article reviews the history of Congress' regulatory efforts to
protect animals and plants threatened with extinction. It next examines
141,054 in 1980, while new housing starts under the VA loan guarantee program totaled
94,743 for the year. Thus, in 1980, between 150,000 and 250,000 starts were insured under
these programs, or between ten and sixteen percent of the new year's housing starts. The
figures are slightly higher for 1978 and 1979; 200,000 to 300,000 new housing starts were
insured under the VA and HUD programs in each of those years. Letter from Donald C.
Demitros, Director of Management Information Systems Division of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, to Katharine Rosenberry (Feb. 17, 1981, and June 4,
1981) (relying on the 1978, 1979, and 1980 Statistical Abstract of the United States); Letter
from Albert W. Glass, Director of Loan Guaranty Service, Veterans Administration, Wash-
ington, D.C., to Katharine Rosenberry (June 2, 1981); Letter from William Bowman, Com-
munity Planning and Development Division of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, to Katharine Rosenberry (July 27, 1981); Letter from Thomas E. Bacon, Jr.,
Communication Services, Office of Public Affairs, Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, to Katharine Rosenberry (July 6, 1981). Copies of all letters cited in this Article
are on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
5. Section 7 is not the only provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that can
affect housing construction. Housing developments also may be affected by § 9, which pro-
hibits any person from "taking" a listed endangered animal. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). See discussion of "taking" in note 26 infra. Section 9 probably
does not expand the responsibilities of federal agencies beyond those already imposed by
§ 7. Section 7 and its regulations already require federal agencies to ensure that their actions
will not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or adversely modify its critical
habitat.
Section 9, however, also applies to actions by private individuals; one may not inten-
tionally or negligently harm or harass a protected animal. Section 9's effect is limited by the
fact that private individuals are not similarly prohibited from harassing plants. No pub-
lished decision fully explores the possible effect of § 9. For example, a court holding that a
person may not develop his or her property because to do so would harass or harm a listed
animal would be faced with a taking issue. The landowner would argue that the federal
government had inversely condemned his or her property. Thus, while there is presently a
dearth of cases dealing with § 9, the potential for litigation is significant.
6. Eg, North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980).
7. E.g., Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
8. E.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (construction of a dam); Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976) (construction of a dam); National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976) (construction of an
interstate highway).
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the Endangered Species Act and its procedures. Finally, the Article
examines several types of federal involvement in housing construction,
and discusses the extent to which each type of involvement may be
controlled by ESA.
History of the Endangered Species Act
Previous Protective Acts •
Congress passed the first comprehensive act for the conservation of
endangered fish and wildlife in 1966.9 The 1966 Act was designed to
establish "a program for the conservation, protection, restoration and
propagation of [endangered] species" and "to consolidate, restate and
modify" the existing collection of authorities protecting various spe-
cies.' 0 The 1966 Act provided protection by controlling activities that
could occur on federal lands within the Federal Wildlife Refuge Sys-
tem." It also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate spe-
cies of endangered native fish and wildlife and to acquire land and
accept funds for the protection of these species. 12
The 1966 Act served merely as a policy statement, however, rather
than as a vehicle for controlling federal actions. First, the 1966 Act
affected only lands located in the Wildlife Refuge System. Second, it
required the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Defense to
protect endangered species only "insofar as [was] practicable and con-
sistent with the primary purposes" of their departments,' 3 and en-
couraged federal agencies to exercise their authority in furtherance of
the 1966 Act only "where practicable."' 14 Thus, the 1966 Act did not
control the effects of federal agencies on endangered species and their
habitats.
9. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926. The 1966 Act
was repealed in 1973, except for §§ 4 and 5, which appear as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668dd-668ee (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Congress had passed acts protecting particular species prior to 1966. See, e.g., Land
and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Black Bass Act of 1926,
ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976)); Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711
(1976)); Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (partially codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 667e, 701
(1976).
10. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(a), 80 Stat. 926, 926 (re-
pealed 1973).
11. Id § 4(c), 80 Stat. 926, 928 (repealed 1973).
12. Id §§ 2(b)-2(c), 80 Stat. 926, 926 (repealed 1973).
13. d § l(b), 80 Stat. 926, 926 (repealed 1973).
14. Id
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In 1969, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Conservation
Act (1969 Act),' 5 which continued the provisions of the 1966 Act and
provided additional protection for endangered animals. The 1969 Act
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to determine which species
were threatened "with worldwide extinction," prohibiting the importa-
tion of these designated species.' 6 The 1969 Act also prohibited the
transportation or sale of wildlife taken in violation of any federal, state,
or foreign law. 17 It did not prohibit, however, the harassment of en-
dangered animals on private land. In effect, the 1969 Act provided no
greater control than the 1966 Act over the projects and programs of
federal departments and agencies.
The Endangered Species Act
In 1973, Congress repealed the 1969 Act and enacted ESA,'
8
which with some modifications remains in effect today. ESA differs
from the prior acts in several important respects. First, ESA extends
protection to threatened species, as well as to endangered species.' 9
Second, ESA protects plants as well as animals. 20 Third, ESA recog-
nizes the importance of protecting the habitats of endangered wild-
life.21 Finally, ESA forces federal departments and agencies to become
actively involved in the protection of endangered and threatened
species.22
ESA empowers the Secretaries of the Interior and of Commerce to
designate endangered and threatened species and to issue regulations to
provide for the conservation of designated species. 23 An endangered
species is "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all
15. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275
(repealed 1973).
16. Id § 3, 83 Stat. 275, 275 (repealed 1973).
17. Id § 7, 83 Stat. 275, 275 (repealed 1973).
18. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976).
20. Id § 1532(16) (Supp. III 1979).
21. Id § 1533(a)(1)(1) (1976).
22. Id § 1536 (Supp. III 1979).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Secretary of Commerce has author-
ity to designate endangered and threatened marine species that are listed in 50 C.F.R.
§§ 222.23, 227.4 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to designate endan-
gered and threatened species found on land or in the air. These are listed in 50 C.F.R.
§§ 17.11 (animals), 17.12 (plants) (1980). Because the endangered and threatened species
located on land are more likely to affect housing construction, this Article is limited to a
discussion of those species identified by the Secretary of the Interior.
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or a significant portion of its range,"24 and a threatened species is "any
species which is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.
'25
ESA protects animals designated as endangered by making it un-
lawful to take, import, export, commercially sell or transport any en-
dangered animal or to possess an unlawfully taken endangered
animal.26 The prohibition against taking27 of endangered animals does
not extend to endangered plants. ESA does, however, protect endan-
gered plants by making it unlawful to import, export, sell commercially
or transport any endangered plant.28 Regulations promulgated by the
Secretary establish the protection afforded plants and animals desig-
nated as threatened.
29
ESA also offers some protection to the habitats of protected plants
and animals.3° Habitat protection is provided both by authorizing the
United States government to acquire designated habitats31 and, be-
cause few habitats can be purchased, by controlling the effects of fed-
eral agency actions on protected species and their critical habitats. 32
ESA controls federal agencies' actions in two ways. First, federal
agencies are required to conserve protected species.33 Agencies have an
affirmative duty to promote an increase in the populations of protected
plants and animals.34 Second, ESA controls actions undertaken by fed-
eral agencies in furtherance of their statutory duties. Prior to amend-
ment, section 7 of the Act stated that all federal agencies must "insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopard-
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (Supp. III 1979). Species of plants and animals designated as
endangered or threatened are listed at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12, 222.23, 227.4 (1980).
25. Id § 1532(20).
26. Id § 1538(a)(1) (1976).
27. The definition of "take" includes "harass" or "harm." Id § 1532(14) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Harass or harm means to annoy intentionally or negligently or to engage in
an act likely to annoy a designated endangered animal to the point of significantly dis-
rupting its normal behavior patterns. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1980).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (1976).
29. Id §§ 1533(d), 1538(a)(1)(G), (2)(D) (1976); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31-.47 (1980).
30. Areas designated as critical habitats of endangered or threatened species are listed
at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.95 (animals), 17.96 (plants) (1980).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
32. The term "species" includes any subspecies of any listed species and also any spe-
des that so closely resembles a listed species that those responsible for enforcement would
have substantial difficulty distinguishing between the listed and unlisted species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(16) (Supp. I1 1979); id § 1533(e) (1976).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (Supp. 1111979).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (Supp. II 1979) states that the term "conserve" means to use
all methods necessary to bring endangered or threatened species to the point at which pro-
tection is no longer necessary.
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ize the continued existence of such endangered species and threatened
species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species . . ... -3 As originally enacted, therefore, ESA contemplated
that its requirements would be imposed upon federal departments and
agencies that took any action with respect to protected species.
The Duty Imposed Upon Federal Agencies
The strength of the original section 7 mandate upon federal de-
partments and agencies was soon tested in several cases involving fed-
eral public works. For example, in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,36 the
plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin construction of the Meramec Dam, located
in Missouri. The plaintiffs contended, among other things, that the
dam's construction would result in the flooding of caves that were the
habitat of the Indiana bat, a protected species, and thus would violate
section 7 of ESA.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the habitat of the Indiana bat
would be affected by the flooding, but held that section 7 of the Act as
originally enacted (1973 Act) had not been violated. Although the De-
partment of the Interior urged a moratorium on the entire project
pending further study of the bat, the Army Corps of Engineers, the
federal agency responsible for the project, suggested that "the Project
would probably have no more than an infinitesimal effect upon the In-
diana bat population in the Meramec Basin. ' 37 The court found that,
when a difference of opinion arises regarding a project, "the responsi-
bility for decision after consultation is not vested in the Secretary [of
the Interior] but in the agency involved. ' 38 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that if a federal agency responsible for a project determines that
the listed species will not be significantly affected, it may proceed with
the project, as long as it has not acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
The Fifth Circuit in National Wildlfe Federation v. Coleman39
found that section 7 of the 1973 Act places a greater burden on the
agency to ensure that its actions are not harmful to a protected species
or to its habitat. In Coleman, the plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin
the construction of a section of an interstate highway through Jackson
35. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (prior to
amendment in 1978 and 1979).
36. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
37. Id at 1305.
38. Id at 1303.
39. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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County, Mississippi, alleging that the proposed highway would traverse
a major portion of the designated critical habitat of the Mississippi
sandhill crane, a protected species. The plaintiffs alleged that the high-
way construction would affect the habitat directly by taking a portion
of the habitat for the highway bed and would affect the habitat indi-
rectly by encouraging residential and commercial development, which
would result in an even greater destruction of the habitat.
The Federal Highway Administration, the agency responsible for
funding the major portion of the highway, reasoned that it had dis-
charged its obligations under section 7 of the 1973 Act for three rea-
sons: (1) other federal agencies intended to establish a refuge for the
sandhill crane; (2) the highway would cross the proposed refuge at its
narrowest point; and (3) the Highway Administration would prohibit
the excavation of destructive borrow pits along the highway.4° The
court refused to uphold the agency's determination.
Observing that the refuge proposed by the agency would be only a
small portion of the designated critical habitat, the court concluded
that the Federal Highway Administration had a "mandatory obliga-
tion" to ensure that its action would not destroy or modify any part of
the habitat.4' The court further concluded that the Department of the
Interior had primary jurisdiction for administering the 1973 Act, and
therefore deferred to the Secretary of the Interior's determination of
what was necessary to bring the proposed highway in compliance with
the 1973 Act.42 Consequently, the court enjoined construction until the
Secretary of the Interior could determine that the Federal Highway
Administration had made the modifications necessary to ensure that
the project would no longer jeopardize the continued existence of the
Mississippi sandhill crane or would destroy or modify its critical
habitat. 43
Thus, the circuits have found differing relationships between the
agency in charge of the project and the Department of the Interior.
The Eighth Circuit in Froehlke concluded that authority to determine
the effect of the proposed federal project lies with the agency responsi-
ble for carrying out the project. On the other hand, while the Fifth
Circuit in Coleman stated that the determination to proceed with a pro-
40. Id at 366-67.
41. Id at 373.
42. Id at 375.
43. The Department of the Interior had demanded three modifications: (1) the elimi-
nation of a proposed interchange, (2) a prohibition of the evacuation of burrow pits any-
where within the critical habitat, and (3) the acquisition of substitute land for a refuge. Id
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTJanuary 1982]
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ject lies with the responsible agency, it enjoined the project until the
Secretary of the Interior determined that the project complied with sec-
tion 7.
The district courts that considered section 7 prior to its amend-
ment also seemed to differ on the degree of restraint imposed on federal
agencies by the statute. In Defenders of Wildlfe v. Andrus,44 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia determined that the rulemaking
process of the Fish and Wildlife Service was inadequate under section
7 of the 1973 Act.45 The court held that the Service had a duty both to
ensure that its hunting regulations did not destroy or modify critical
habitats and to use all methods necessary to improve the reproductive
and survival rate of protected species. The court concluded that "[t]he
service cannot limit its focus to what it considers the most important
management tool available to it, i.e. habitat control, to accomplish this
end."'46 Instead, it must pursue all appropriate means to bring pro-
tected species back from the brink of extinction.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas held hunting
regulations promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service invalid in
Connor v. Andrus.47 In this case, however, the court did not hold that
the hunting regulations were too lax; instead, it held that the hunting
regulations were too stringent and, therefore, arbitrary. Recognizing
that the Mexican duck was an endangered species, the court observed
that the Fish and Wildlife Service had an affirmative duty to promote
an increase in the population of the Mexican duck. It held, however,
that hunting regulations prohibiting the killing of all ducks in certain
areas of Texas and New Mexico were unreasonable because cross-
breeding and habitat destruction, rather than hunting, were the major
factors leading to the extinction of the Mexican duck.
48
These district courts thus interpreted section 7 in slightly different
ways. In Defenders of Wildlfe, the court held that the Fish and Wild-
life Service had not fulfilled its section 7 obligation because it had not
fully considered the impact of its regulations on an endangered species.
44. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
45. Although shooting of endangered species had been banned, regulations promul-
gated by the Service permitted hunting of unprotected game birds during the twilight hours,
when reduced visibility was likely to result in misidentification and accidental killing of
protected birds. The rulemaking proceedings had not addressed this issue. "Based on evi-
dence that the most important factor affecting the population of a given species is the quality
of its habitat, the Service [had] concluded that it was unlikely that a minor alteration in
shooting hours would jeopardize a species." Id at 169.
46. Id at 170.
47. 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
48. Id at 1041.
[Vol. 33
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Connor, on the other hand, the court held that the Service had ex-
ceeded the scope of its section 7 obligation in promulgating hunting
regulations. The District of Columbia district court appeared to prefer
overprotection, while the Texas district court appeared to prefer
underprotection.
Questions concerning the effect of section 7 on federal agencies'
projects were partially resolved in 1978 in Tennessee Valley Authoriay
(TV4) v. Hi. 49 The plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the completion of
the Tellico Dam in Tennessee, alleging that completion of the dam
would destroy the critical habitat of the snail darter, a protected spe-
cies, and thereby result in the extinction of the fish. Although the dam
was seventy to eighty percent complete before the Secretary of the Inte-
rior designated the snail darter an endangered species, and although
more than $100 million had already been spent on construction of the
dam, the Supreme Court enjoined construction of the dam.
After tracing the legislative history of section 7, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had not intended the costs and benefits of a par-
ticular project to be balanced against the costs of the extinction of a
species. By passing the Act, Congress determined that the cost of ex-
tinction was incalculable.50 The Court noted that, although the 1973
Act allowed exceptions to be made in certain cases, none of these
"hardship exemptions" were available to federal agencies.51 Instead,
Congress expected section 7 to prohibit absolutely the completion of
the construction of a federal project that would destroy the critical
habitat of an endangered species.
5 2
Shortly after TVA v. Hill, a district court enjoined the construction
of the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir, located in Wyoming. In Ne-
braska v. Rural Electrfcation Administration (REA),53 two federal
agencies were involved in the reservoir project. The REA had granted
the project a loan guarantee for sixty-six percent of the cost of its con-
struction,54 and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) had issued a
49. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
50. "fT]he plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly
that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 'incalculable.' Quite obviously, it
would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain-even $100 million-
against a congressionally declared 'incalculable' value, even assuming we had the power to
engage in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not." Id at 187-88.
51. Id at 188.
52. Id at 186-87. "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Id at 184.
53. 12 E.R.C. 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
54. Staff Report on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir to the Endangered Species Commit-
tee at i (Jan. 19, 1979).
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dredge and fill permit.
The court declared the REA's loan guarantee unlawful, conclud-
ing that section 7 required the REA to consult with the Fish and Wild-
life Service about the effect of the Grayrocks Dam on a listed
endangered species, the whooping crane. The REA alleged that it did
not consult with the Service because the REA had concluded indepen-
dently that the whooping crane would not be adversely affected.55
Rejecting the REA's argument, the court concluded that the
agency did not have the power to decide whether consultation was nec-
essary. The 1973 Act required consultation whenever a protected spe-
cies might be affected. 56 The court further concluded that the REA did
not satisfy its burden of proving that the project would ensure that the
listed species would not be jeopardized.
57
Although the whooping crane was not listed as an endangered spe-
cies at the time the Corps issued the dredge and fill permit, the court
held that section 7 regulated the permit issued by the Corps, reasoning
that once the area was listed as a critical habitat of the crane, the Corps
was obligated to use all methods and procedures necessary to preserve
the species.58 The court thus held that the REA loan guarantee com-
mitments were unlawful, that the Corps permit was unlawful, and that
the Grayrocks Dam could not be built until the REA and the Corps
complied with section 7 of the 1973 Act. Before the case could be re-
solved, however, Congress passed an amendment to ESA,59 which
made resolution unnecessary.
60
Exemption From the Act
The 1978 and 1979 amendments to section 7 provide a procedure
by which a federal agency may obtain an exemption from the mandates
of ESA.61 The Supreme Court had held that the mandates of section 7
were absolute and did not permit a balancing of competing interests.
62
After amendment, however, the Act itself authorized an exemption,
and provided a detailed exemption procedure.63
As amended, ESA requires a federal agency to request informa-
55. 12 E.R.C. at 1170.
56. Id; 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
57. 12 E.R.C. at 1171-72.
58. Id at 1172-73.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979).
60. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979).
62. See notes 49-52 & accompanying text supra.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979); 50 C.F.R. §§ 450.01-453.06 (1980).
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tion from the Secretary of the Interior regarding the possible existence
of protected species in areas to be affected by agency projects. 64 If a
project is likely to affect a protected species or its habitat, the agency
must consult the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce
about this effect.6 5 During the consultation process, which must be
concluded within ninety days,66 the federal agency is prohibited from
making any irretrievable commitment of resources that would foreclose
the implementation of alternatives that would preserve the listed
species. 67
At the conclusion of the consultation period, the Secretary of the
Interior or the Secretary of Commerce must provide the federal agency
with a written opinion and summary of the information on which the
opinion is based, describing how the agency's action affects a listed spe-
cies or its critical habitat.68 The Secretary's opinion must suggest rea-
sonable alternatives to the project that would avoid jeopardizing the
species or its habitat.69 If the agency, the governor of the state in which
the agency action is to occur, or a permit or license applicant seeks to
proceed as originally proposed, the interested party may apply for an
exemption.70
Application for an exemption must be made within ninety days of
the conclusion of the consultation process.71 A review board is then
established 72 to review the project's effect on the species. 73 The board
must determine (1) whether an irresolvable conflict exists, (2) whether
the applicant has carried out its consultation responsibilities in bad
faith and without a reasonable effort to develop modifications or alter-
natives that would not jeopardize the protected species, (3) whether the
agency has failed to conduct biological assessments as required by
ESA, or (4) whether the agency has made any irreversible commitment
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (Supp. 1111979).
65. Id § 1536(a)(3).
66. Id § 1536(b).
67. Id § 1536(d).
68. Id § 1536(b).
69. Id
70. Id § 1536(g)(1).
71. Id § 1536(g)(2)(A).
72. Id § 1536(g)(3)(A). The review board is composed of three members. One is ap-
pointed by the Secretary of the Interior, another is appointed by the President and must be a
resident of a state that is affected by the project, and the third is an administrative law judge,
appointed by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
73. The board must complete its review within 60 days of its appointment or within a
longer time as agreed by the exemption applicant and the Secretary. During this review, the
board may solicit information from other government agencies and hold hearings. d
§ 1536(g)(5), (9)(A).
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of resources as prohibited by ESA.74 If any of these determinations are
positive, the application for exemption must be denied. 75
If, on the other hand, the board makes a negative finding in all
four categories, the board must then thoroughly review the project and
submit a report to the Endangered Species Committee (Committee).
76
The Committee must grant an exemption if it determines, based on the
report of the review board and on other testiniony or evidence it has
received, that:
[1] there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
[2] the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alter-
native courses of action .... and such action is in the public
interest;
[3] the action is of regional or national significance; and
[4] [the Committee] establishes such reasonable mitigation and en-
hancement measures .. as are necessary and appropriate to mini-
mize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered
species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned.
77
With some minor exceptions, 78 the Committee's decision is final.
Application of the Exemption Procedure
Although the full exemption procedure outlined in ESA has not
yet been used, a modification of the procedure was used for the Tellico
Dam and the Grayrocks Dam cases. When Congress amended ESA in
1978, it directed the Endangered Species Committee to consider the
exemption of the Tellico and Grayrocks Dams within thirty days of the
enactment of the 1978 amendment. 79 Congress in effect found that the
projects were of regional or national significance and stated that the
74. Id. § 1536(g)(5).
75. Id
76. The Endangered Species Committee is composed of the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Secretary of the Army, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one person from each af-
fected state, appointed by the President. Id § 1536(e). The Committee must make a final
determination on the application within 90 days. Id § 1536(h)(1).
77. Id § 1536(h)(1)(A), (B).
78. Exceptions may occur in the following circumstances: (1) The Secretary of the In-
terior determines that a species that "was not the subject of consultation. . . or was not
identified in any biological assessment conducted" and would become extinct as a result of
the exemption. Id § 1536(h)(2)(B)(i). (2) The Secretary of State finds that the exemption
violates an international treaty obligation of the United States. Id § 1536(i). (3) The Presi-
dent determines that the project is necessary to avert a disaster, in an emergency situation.
Id § 1536(p). (4) The Secretary of Defense finds that an exemption is necessary for reasons
of national security. Id § 1536(j).
79. Id § 1539(i)(1).
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Committee had to grant an exemption if the other criteria 80 were satis-
fied. The Committee met on January 23, 1979, to consider both
projects. 8' It denied an exemption for the Tellico Dam82 and granted
an exemption for the Grayrocks Dam.
8 3
Committee staff testified in the Tellico Dam hearing that the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA), the responsible federal agency, had de-
veloped an alternative to completion of the dam.84 The alternative,
referred to as the "River Development," involved removing the dam
and developing the river for agricultural, recreational, industrial, and
other uses. The TVA estimated that the measurable benefits were
slightly greater for the Tellico Dam than for the River Development;
however, the River Development also would generate immeasurable
benefits, such as "preservation of customary fish and wildlife values,
including trout fishing, and ecological, esthetic and scenic value."
8 5
The Committee unanimously denied an exemption because there
clearly was a reasonable alternative that would preserve the snail
darter.
86
In contrast, the Committee did grant an exemption to the
Grayrocks Dam.87 The decision was based on a settlement agreement
between the parties,88 which provided that the Missouri Basin Power
Project would limit its maximum annual use, would release water dur-
80. See note 77 & accompanying text supra.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(i)(1) (Supp. III 1979). Normally, to grant an exemption, the Com-
mittee must find that the project is of regional or national significance pursuant to Id
§ 1536(h)(i)(A)(iii). However, Congress stated that the Committee could exempt Grayrocks
Dam and Tellico Dam without this finding. Id § 1539(i)(1).
82. Transcript of Endangered Species Comm. Mtg., Dep't of the Interior (Jan. 23,
1979).
83. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Tellico Dam and Reservoir Application
for Exemption (Feb. 7, 1979).
84. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Applica-
tion for Exemption (Feb. 7, 1979).
85. Transcript of Endangered Species Comm. Mtg., Dep't of the Interior at 14-18 (Jan.
23, 1979).
86. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Tellico Dam and Reservoir Application
for Exemption at 3 (Feb. 7, 1979). Apparently, the costs and benefits were so closely bal-
anced between the completion of the dam and the "River Development" that even the TVA
was unable to make a recommendation on whether the dam should be exempted. Transcript
of Endangered Species Comm. Mtg., Dep't of the Interior at 21 (Jan. 23, 1979). Endangered
Species Comm. Decision on Tellico Dam and Reservoir Application for Exemption at 4
(Feb. 7, 1979). Despite the Committee's decision, Congress subsequently granted an exemp-
tion for Tellico Dam and authorized construction pursuant to a rider to the Energy and
Water Development Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-99, 93 Stat. 437 (1980).
87. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Applica-
tion for Exemption at 1 (Feb. 7, 1979).
88. The settlement was obtained in Nebraska v. REA, 12 E.R.C. 1156 (1978), which
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ing various periods of the year, would replace water withdrawn by
Corn Creek Irrigation District, and would establish a trust fund of $7.5
million for the maintenance and enhancement of the whooping crane's
remaining critical habitat along the Platte River. 9 For the settlement
agreement to be effective, however, two conditions had to be met.
First, the Secretary of the Interior had to approve the agreement as
satisfying the requirements of the Act; this approval was obtained.90
Second, the Committee had to grant an exemption under ESA or de-
cide that an exemption was unnecessary. The Committee unanimously
endorsed the settlement, granting an exemption according to the terms
of the settlement.91
As illustrated in these cases, ESA has influenced federal agency
action. The published decisions, however, do not determine the degree
of federal involvement necessary to invoke the Act.92 The application
of ESA to federal agency action in housing construction is thus unclear.
was the suit challenging the Grayrocks Dam. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on
Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Application for Exemption at 1-2 (Feb. 7, 1979).
89. Id
90. Transcript of Endangered Species Comm. Mtg., Dep't of the Interior at 10 (Jan. 23,
1979).
91. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Applica-
tion for Exemption at 2 (Feb. 7, 1979).
92. Although the exemption process has only been used twice, the consultation process
provided in ESA has been used on numerous occasions. In fiscal year 1979, the Fish and
Wildlife Service received approximately 2,500 requests for consultation. Fifteen hundred of
these requests were for informal consultations, for which no biological opinions were ren-
dered, and 1,000 were requests for formal consultation, for which biological opinions were
rendered. In fiscal 1980, the Fish Wildlife Service received approximately 3010 informal
requests and 750 formal requests. In the first half of fiscal 1981, it received 2515 informal
requests and 225 formal requests. Telephone interview with Nancy Sweeny, Consultation
Coordinator, Office of Endangered Species, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
Interior, Washington, D.C., (May 7, 1981). The National Marine Fisheries Service in the
Department of Commerce has also received requests for consultation with respect to species
that are under their jurisdiction and listed in 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23, 227.4 (1980). The Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service does not, however, have records identifying the total number
of requests for consultation. Telephone interview with Charles Kornella, National Marine
Fisheries Service, Department of Commerce, San Diego, California (May 27, 1981).
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980), the remaining
published decision addressing § 7 of ESA decided after the 1979 amendments, the plaintiffs
alleged that the federal government violated ESA by offering offshore oil leases for sale and
permitting pre-exploratory activities before the National Marine Fisheries Service rendered
a formal biological opinion discussing whether the oil drilling would jeopardize the Bow-
head Whale, a listed species. The court concluded that the government could not permit
pre-exploration activities because, without a biological opinion, it could not ensure the
safety of the work.
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Federal Agencies Involved in Housing Construction
The Endangered Species Act includes within its scope "any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal] agency." 93 If this lan-
guage were interpreted literally, all federal actions, even those actions
only remotely facilitating housing construction, would be controlled by
ESA. An examination of congressional intent in enacting ESA, rules
promulgated pursuant to ESA, and cases decided under similar stat-
utes, however, indicates that such an expansive view of ESA is unwar-
ranted. Those actions that only remotely affect housing construction
should not be controlled by ESA.
Direct Effects
Authorizing Construction
A federal agency can affect housing construction directly by grant-
ing a permit authorizing construction. Although construction permits
are generally granted or denied at the local level, in at least two in-
stances a developer may need a permit issued by a federal agency to
construct housing units.
First, Congress has prohibited the construction of any structure in
a port, harbor, canal, navigable water, or other water of the United
States without the approval of the Army Corps of Engineers.94 Once
waters are determined to be navigable,95 the entire surface of the body
of water is deemed navigable, and the determination of navigability
will not be extinguished by subsequent modifications that destroy navi-
gability.96 "Navigable waters," therefore, need not be presently capa-
ble of navigation. Under this section, permits have been required for a
housing project that included the construction of an internal waterway
connecting with navigable waters,97 construction of an apartment
building on private, submerged, lake-front property,98 and construction
of a trailer park on private, submerged, bay-front property.99
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). An exception is made for those projects affirmatively au-
thorized by Congress. Id
95. The term "navigable water" is defined as "waters that are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be suscepti-
ble for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1981).
96. Id
97. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976).
98. Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973).
99. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Second, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act'0° requires a de-
veloper to obtain a permit from the Corps if the developer's proposed
housing project will result in dredging or filling in any navigable
water. 01 The Act's purpose is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 0 2 As the
term "navigable waters" is defined broadly in the Act to include coastal
waters, navigable lakes, rivers, and streams, isolated wetlands and
lakes, intermittent streams and canals, and any other waters that the
Corps determines should be regulated for the protection of water quali-
ty,10 3 the Corps' jurisdiction over housing development is even greater
under this Act than it is under section 403.
Under the Water Pollution Act, developers have been required to
obtain permits for clearing wetlands of trees and vegetation,"°4 filling a
river that is the source of a supply for lakes used for recreation, 0 5 con-
struction of a road that led from a state road through a lowland forest
to a homesite, 0 6 and brushing and grading land that contained vernal
pools only during the spring.'
0 7
The Corps, therefore, can affect housing through its permit pro-
cess. This permit process should be subject to the Endangered Species
Act. Although there are no published decisions addressing the rela-
tionship of ESA to housing construction, ESA should prohibit the
Corps from issuing a permit to a developer whose project will jeopard-
ize the continued existence of a protected species or adversely modify a
critical habitat.
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (Supp. III 1979). Pursuant to this Act, the Corps issued 5,282
permits in fiscal 1978, 4,401 permits in fiscal 1979, and 3,596 permits in fiscal 1980. Letter
from George Brazier, Directorate of Civil Works, Department of the Army, Office of Chief
of Engineers, to Katharine Rosenberry (June 9, 1981). The Corps, however, has not indi-
cated how many of these permits involved housing projects.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976):
103. 40 C.F.R. § 230.8(2) (Appendix A) (1981). The Act defines navigable water as "wa-
ters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976).
104. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. La. 1979).
105. United States v. D'Annolfo, 474 F. Supp. 220 (D. Mass. 1979).
106. United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
107. Letter from Gwynn A. Teague, Chief Engineer, Department of the Army, Army
Corps of Engineers, to James F. Gleason, Director, Environmental Quality Department,
City of San Diego, California (May 29, 1979). Vernal pools are isolated wetlands that are
depressions in the earth containing water only a couple of months per year.
The Corps issued 2,481 dredge and fill permits in fiscal 1978, 2,280 permits in fical 1979,
and 2,174 permits in fiscal 1980. Letter from George Brazier, Directorate of Civil Works,
Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Engineers, to Katharine Rosenberry (June 9,
1981). The Corps, however, has not identified how many of these permits involved housing
projects.
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Several reasons mandate this conclusion. The Corps is a federal
agency that issues permits.108 ESA's regulations specifically state that
ESA applies to any federal agency that issues permits.' 0 9 In addition,
the Corps has promulgated regulations recognizing that ESA is "re-
lated" to the Corps' permitting process," 0 and that the Act must be
"followed and considered.""' Moreover, in Nebraska v. RE4112 the
court has prevented the Corps from issuing a permit for construction
until the Corps had complied with ESA's consultation process. Finally,
the Endangered Species Committee determined that Grayrocks Dam,
which was authorized by the Corps, needed an exemption from ESA."
3
If ESA were not applicable, there would be no need for an exemption.
Therefore, ESA should govern the Corps' grant of a permit to a
developer.
Funding Construction
A federal agency's action also may invoke the Act by funding con-
struction of housing units. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has funded, in whole or in part, a large number
of housing units in recent years. 14 Because HUD is a department of
the United States government, 1 5 and funding is an action within the
scope of the Act," 6 a court should conclude that the construction of
these units should be governed by the Act. Thus, HUD should not
fund, in whole or in part, any housing units that would jeopardize the
continued existence of any protected species or adversely modify its
critical habitat.
This conclusion is supported by case law, regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Act, and comparisons with similar statutes. In TVA v.
Hill,1 7 Congress appropriated funds for a wholly owned public corpo-
ration of the United States, the Tennessee Valley Authority, to con-
struct the Tellico Dam. As the dam was constructed entirely with
federal funds, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Act
108. The Corps is within the Department of the Army, which is a department of the
federal government. 10 U.S.C. § 3063 (1976).
109. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1980).
110. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1(a), 320.3(i) (1981).
111. 33 C.F.R. §320.40)(4) (1981).
112. 12 E.R.C. 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
113. Endangered Species Comm. Decision on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Applica-
tion for Exemption at 1 (Feb. 7, 1979). See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra.
114. See note 4supra.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 3502 (1976).
116. See note 93 & accompanying text supra.
117. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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required that the construction of the dam comply with the substantive
provisions of the Act.'" By analogy, the construction of housing units
funded exclusively by HUD should also be controlled by ESA.
Housing units, however, are also constructed with partial federal
funding. It is less clear whether ESA applies if federal funds constitute
only a portion of the construction funds. Regulations have defined
ESA's scope to include "all actions of any kind, authorized, funded or
carried out in whole or in part by federal agencies,"'"19 illustrating that
the Department of the Interior, which is responsible for carrying out
the Act and promulgating its regulations, finds partial funding suffi-
cient to invoke ESA. The only published decision brought under the
Act concerning a project partially, rather than exclusively, constructed
with federal funds is National Wildiffe Federation v. Coleman.120 In this
case, the highway project was only ninety percent financed by the fed-
eral government, but neither party raised the issue of ESA's application
to projects partially funded by the federal government. Thus, no pub-
lished judicial decision' 2' and no decision of the Endangered Species
Committee 22 has raised the issue of whether ESA applies to a project
only partially funded by the federal government. The construction of
housing should be deemed subject to ESA, however, if any portion of
the construction funds are supplied by the federal government.
Comparisons to similar statutes support this conclusion. Like the
Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental Policy Act 23
(NEPA) was enacted to regulate federal agency actions that threaten
the environment. 24 NEPA carries out its purpose by requiring that
federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for
every major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the
118. Id at 173.
119. 50 C.F.R. § 450.01(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
120. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
121. In Nebraska v. REA, 12 E.R.C. 1156 (1978), the Rural Electrification Administra-
tion, a federal agency, guaranteed loans for construction of the Grayrocks Dam. REA only
guaranteed 66 % of the construction loan, Staff Report on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir to
the Endangered Species Committee at i (Jan. 19, 1979), but the parties again failed to raise
the issue of partial funding.
122. The Endangered Species Committee also failed to raise the issue when the propo-
nents of Grayrocks Dam came before it seeking an exemption. See text accompanying notes
88-92 supra.
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
124. NEPA was enacted "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man, and to enrich
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation
. .. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
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human environment. 125 While ESA applies to "all actions funded, au-
thorized or carried out" by federal agencies, the EIS requirement of
NEPA applies only to "major federal actions." Invocation of NEPA,
therefore, appears to require a more significant federal involvement
than does invocation of ESA. Consequently, an action construed as a
"major" federal action under NEPA should be construed as any federal
action under ESA.
In Dalsis v. Hills, 126 HUD had approved a private redevelopment
project and also had funded demolition of substandard structures in the
project area. The court stated that this action constituted a major fed-
eral action subject to NEPA and that even a private developer may be
enjoined under NEPA when "it has entered into a partnership or joint
venture with HUD or has been the recipient of federal funds."12 7
Thus, under NEPA even partial funding of a project may constitute a
major federal action.1
28
Additionally, in highway construction cases, courts have held that
NEPA applies even though the highway construction is financed jointly
by federal and state agencies. 129 Thus, federal agencies can be engaged
in a "major federal action" under NEPA and the project can be en-
joined if even a portion of the project is funded with federal funds.
Partial funding is also sufficient to bring a federal agency with the
dictates of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), an act
analogous to ESA. In enacting NHPA, Congress found that "the his-
torical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a
living part of our community life and development .. ."130 In enact-
ing ESA, Congress found that wildlife should be preserved because it is
of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreation and scientific
value to the Nation and its people."' 131 Congress thus enacted NHPA
to preserve our cultural heritage and ESA to preserve our biological
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
126. 424 F. Supp. 784 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
127. Id at 787. An injunction nevertheless was denied in this action because the plain-
tiff failed to show that irreparable harm would otherwise result.
128. Similarly, in Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89
(D. Mass. 1972), the court concluded that HUD's contribution of funds to a local redevelop-
ment project constituted a major federal action subject to NEPA.
129. See, eg., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849 (8th
Cir. 1973); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Farmland Preservation Ass'n v. Ad-
ams, 491 F. Supp. 601, a'd, 611 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1979).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(3) (1976).
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heritage. Both preserve our heritage by controlling federal agency
action.
Pursuant to NHPA, "the head of any Federal agency having...
jurisdiction over a proposed Federal undertaking. . .[must] take into
account the effect of the undertaking on any . . . site . . . that is in-
cluded in. . .the National Register."' 132 In Hall County Historical So-
ciety v. Georgia Department of Transportation,33 the court concluded
that, even though the highway construction at issue was a joint state-
federal undertaking, the federal agency was nevertheless responsible
for taking into account the impact of the highway on an historic dis-
trict. Thus, the federal agency was still bound by NHPA, although the
federal agency was only partially responsible for the undertaking.
Consequently, ESA should apply to the construction of housing
units if those units are even partially funded by a federal agency. First,
the only cases under ESA involving partial funding assume partial
funding is sufficient to invoke ESA. Second, the Endangered Species
Committee apparently agrees that partial funding is sufficient. Third,
ESA regulations specifically state that an action funded "in part" is
controlled by ESA. Finally, NEPA and NHPA, analogous acts, can
apply to a project even if it is only partially funded by the federal gov-
ernment. Therefore, both public and private housing construction
should be subject to ESA if a federal agency, such as HUD, contributes
any funds to the construction.
This simple rule may be subject to two qualifications. First, a pro-
ject that has not received any federal funds directly might in an unu-
sual circumstance be held bound by ESA. This qualification is
illustrated by Ely v. Velde, 134 in which the State of Virginia applied for
and received federal grants to construct a penal center. 35 In an earlier
decision, the Fourth Circuit had determined that the project was sub-
ject to NEPA and NHPA because the federal funding of the project
constituted a major federal undertaking. 36 Subsequently, the state leg-
islature reallocated the federal funds to other crime prevention pro-
grams and substituted state funds for the construction of the penal
center. The state then claimed that its construction was not subject to
NEPA and NHPA because the penal center was being built with state
132. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976).
133. 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
134. 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974).
135. The block grants were obtained pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3797 (1976 & Supp.. 1979).
136. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1137-39 (4th Cir. 1971).
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funds. Agreeing that NEPA and NHPA did not apply to construction
of the penal center if built with state funds, the court concluded that the
state must return the federal funds to avoid being governed by NEPA
and NHPA.
The selection of new projects for the center's federal funds may make
it impossible, as the state asserts, to prove that the federal funds re-
leased state funds for the center. But this argument misses the mark.
The significant point is that the state is retaining federal funds that it
obtained for the center on the premise that it would comply with
federal environmental Acts, while at the same time it is planning to
construct the center without compliance.13
7
Although the court refused to enjoin the construction of the center, it
held that the "funds allocated for its construction were impressed with
a commitment to preserve the environment of [an historic district]."
13 8
The state could thus construct the center independently of the federal
Act only if it returned the federal funds.
By analogy, construction of housing units with state or local funds
might still be governed by ESA if the units were originally to be con-
structed with federal funds that the state or local government trans-
ferred to its general funds. The protections afforded by the Act should
not be avoided through creative bookkeeping.
139
A second qualification is that, in some circumstances, housing
units built with federal funds should not be subject to ESA. This quali-
fication is illustrated by Carolina Action v. Simon,140 in which the plain-
tiff filed an action to enjoin the construction of a local government
building on the grounds that the construction violated NEPA: al-
though the structure was partially funded by federal revenue sharing
funds, no EIS had been prepared. The court held, however, that
"NEPA does not apply to a project in which the only federal participa-
tion is the distribution of revenue sharing funds to aid local communi-
ties in financing the project."'
4'
The court based its conclusion on three grounds. First, the court
recognized that the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines state
137. 497 F.2d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 1973).
138. Id at 257.
139. See Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving an attempt to evade NEPA re-
quirements by dividing a highway project into segments).
140. 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C.), a'd, 522 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1975). The appellate
court adopted the district court's decision.
141. Id at 1245.
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that NEPA is not applicable to revenue sharing funds. 142 Second, the
court noted the nature of federal revenue sharing funds: revenue shar-
ing funds "are not disbursed as a consequence of a state's request and
are not conditioned on the filing of a comprehensive plan but are dis-
bursed almost automatically and with considerably less federal in-
volvement."' 143 Finally, the court concluded the legislative history of
the revenue sharing act' 44 indicates that the government did not intend
to require federal control or federal approval of specific projects . 4 5
Therefore, the court held that NEPA did not apply to the construction
of a building that was funded with federal revenue sharing funds. Sim-
ilarly, ESA should not regulate any construction with federal funds
that are allocated to a state or local government without reference to a
specific project and without federal control.
Lending Money for Construction
In addition to funding construction, a federal agency can directly
affect the housing market by loaning money for the construction or
purchase of a new dwelling unit. 46 Loaning federal money appears to
be an action "authorized, funded or carried out" within the meaning of
ESA. 147  Such construction funded with a federal loan, therefore,
should comply with ESA.148
142. Council on Environmental Quality, Preparation of Environmental Impact State-
ments, Guidelines §§ 1500.5(a)(2).
143. 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The court contrasted revenue sharing
funds with block grant funds, which were obtained in Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir.
1974), noting that block grant funds are generated by a state's request for federal participa-
tion pursuant to a comprehensive plan. The court thus suggested that block grant funds
require a greater federal involvement. 389 F. Supp. at 1248.
144. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1265 (1976).
145. 389 F. Supp. at 1248.
146. See note 4 supra.
147. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
148. ESA applies to a "department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States", 16
U.S.C. § 1532(7) (Supp. III 1979), and to "each authority of the government", 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02 (1980). In the context of conflicting state and federal banking laws, federally
chartered institutions have been held to be "instrumentalities of the Federal government."
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896); see Rushton v. Schram, 143 F.2d
554 (6th Cir. 1944); Starr v. O'Connor, 118 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1941); Smith v. Witherow, 102
F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1939); Coon v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Ill. 1933). If these federally
chartered institutions are deemed to be instrumentalities in the context of ESA, then ESA
would be invoked to regulate their financing of housing construction. The decisions in the
context of banking laws, however, indicate only that a financial institution is governed by
the law of the entity that chartered it and do not suggest that actions by financial institutions




HUD and the Veterans Administration (VA) guarantee loans for
the construction and purchase of new homes. 149 Both HUD and the
VA are departments of the federal government, 150 and all the loan
guarantee programs that they administer are funded by the federal gov-
ernment. 151 These loan guarantee programs potentially affect a large
amount of housing construction.
To determine whether ESA ought to apply to loan guarantee pro-
grams, the statute and its regulations must first be examined. Neither
the Act nor the regulations promulgated by the Department of the Inte-
rior include loan guarantees in the definition of "federal activities and
programs."' 152 One regulation, however, does state that the Act controls
"federal actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land,
water, or air."'153 Arguably, loan guarantees cause modifications to
land "indirectly" if a developer engages in construction in reliance on
loan guarantees.
Furthermore, while regulations promulgated by the VA pursuant
to its loan guarantee program do not mention ESA, HUD regulations
do refer to ESA: HUD must review a proposed project's impact on
owned institution should be based only on a clear congressional intent or the fulfillment of
ESA's policies.
A court is unlikely to conclude that a federally chartered bank or savings and loan is an
instrumentality of the federal government, if the issue were presented in the context of ESA,
because these financial institutions are not generally considered to be agencies of the federal
government. For example, the Internal Revenue Code provides that federally chartered
banks and savings and loans must pay federal income tax. I.R.C. § 581 (1976); see Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.581-1,1.581-2 (1960). Unlike federal agencies, they are not exempt from federal
income tax. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(1) (1976). In addition, the Code does not distinguish be-
tween federally chartered financial institutions and state chartered institutions. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 581 (1976). Although banks that are members of the FDIC, savings and loan as-
sociations, and members of any Federal Home Loan Bank can be employed as fiscal agents
of the United States, 12 U.S.C. § 265 (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(k) (Supp. IV 1980), the legis-
lative history of ESA does not suggest that Congress intended this limited role of fiscal agent
to be a federal involvement sufficient to invoke ESA. Absent this congressional intent, the
ESA requirement that an entity be an instrumentality of the United States should not be
construed broadly to include financial institutions acting as fiscal agents of the federal
government.
149. See United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Programs of
HUD (1978); 38 U.S.C. § 1810 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3532 (1976); 38 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
151. See National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 38
U.S.C. § 1824 (1976).
152. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1980).
153. Id
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protected species and, if a HUD action is likely to affect a protected
species, HUD must consult with the Department of the Interior or the
Department of Commerce. 154 HUD regulations, however, do not re-
quire that HUD refuse to guarantee a loan for construction or purchase
if the Department of the Interior or the Department of Commerce de-
termines that the construction of the unit will jeopardize a protected
species or adversely modify a critical habitat. Therefore, it is necessary
to look outside of HUD and its regulations to determine whether ESA
should control federal loan guarantee programs.
The only published decision decided under ESA that involved a
loan guarantee program is Nebraska v. REA. 155 The REA insured
sixty-six percent of the loans for the construction of the Grayrocks
Dam.1 56 The court held that ESA controlled the REA's loan guarantee
program, and found the loan guarantee commitments to be unlawful
because of the REA's failure to follow both ESA and NEPA. The
court did not, however, enjoin the construction of the project based on
REA's involvement because it concluded that a loan guarantee was not
sufficient to create a partnership between REA and the private
developer.157
The Fifth Circuit also has suggested that actions having only an
indirect effect on protected species should be subject to ESA. In Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 58 the Department of Transpor-
tation sought to construct a highway across a portion of the critical
habitat of the Mississippi sandhill crane, an endangered species. The
plaintiffs contended that along with the direct loss of crane habitat,
such construction would facilitate and encourage private development
along the highway, adversely modifying the remainder of the crane's
critical habitat. The defendants recognized this indirect effect in their
EIS, stating that they had "no control" over private development of
154. 24 C.F.R. § 50.43 (1980).
155. 12 E.R.C. 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
156. Staff Report on Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir Project to the Endangered Species
Committee at i (Jan. 19, 1979).
157. 12 E.R.C. at 1181. The Nebraska court enjoined the construction, however, be-
cause the Army Corps of Engineers issued the permit without an adequate EIS and because
it had failed to comply with the requirements of ESA. The issue became moot when the
Endangered Species Committee granted an exemption to the Grayrocks Dam project. See
text accompanying notes 79-92 supra. The Committee apparently assumed that the loan
guarantee program was subject to the ESA because it concluded an exemption was neces-
sary. If the ESA did not apply to the REA's loan guarantee program, the committee pre-
sumably would not have had to decide whether to grant an exemption.
158. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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privately owned land.159 Simply recognizing the danger to the crane,
however, did not satisfy section 7; the court held that the defendants
must take the necessary steps to ensure that the highway would not
jeopardize the crane or modify its habitat.160 "The fact that the private
development surrounding the highway. . does not result from direct
federal action does not lessen the appellee's duty under § 7."161 This
court, like the Nebraska court, recognized that federal actions having
only an indirect effect on protected species or their critical habitants are
also subject to the requirements of ESA.
The contention that ESA governs federal loan guarantees is also
supported by comparisons with NEPA. The EIS requirement under
NEPA applies to "major federal action significantly affecting the envi-
ronment."' 62 In Sierra Club v. Lynn,163 HUD made an offer of com-
mitment to guarantee $18 million in bond obligations for the
development of a new community consisting of 28,676 dwelling
units. 1'4 In determining that HUD's action was subject to NEPA re-
quirements, the court held that "HUD's commitment to guarantee 18
million dollars in bond obligations for the Ranch constituted a major
federal action 'significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment .. ' "165
Similarly, both HUD and the courts have assumed that HUD's
insuring a loan constitutes a major federal action, obligating HUD to
satisfy NEPA requirements. In Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn,
66
HUD insured a $3,763,200 loan to a private developer pursuant to the
National Housing Act, 167 which provides federal mortgage insurance
for housing projects designed for low and moderate income families.
The court assumed that HUD had to satisfy NEPA requirements. 68
An action that constitutes a "major federal action" under NEPA
should constitute a "federal action" under ESA. Therefore, ESA
should also apply to loan guarantee programs.
159. Id at 365-66.
160. Id at 373.
161. Id at 374.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
163. 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
164. 502 F.2d at 57.
165. Id at 57-58.
166. 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
167. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j) (1976).
168. Similarly, in Wilson v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1974), the court stated
that "[a]ll the parties agree that the mortgage insurance undertaken by HUD and the guar-
antee of interest payments to be made by the Developer by HUD constitute 'major federal
action.'" Id at 935.
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The VA has also indicated its belief that loan guarantee and simi-
lar financing programs are subject to ESA, as illustrated by its recent
actions involving a housing development in San Diego, California. In
1974, the VA approved grading plans for the subdivision of 279 acres
on which the developer planned to build 1,429 dwelling units. In Sep-
tember 1978, the Department of the Interior published a proposed final
rule listing Pogogyne abramsii, the San Diego mesa mint, as an endan-
gered plant species. 169 The rule was to become effective on October 29,
1978.170 Noting that the proposed subdivision might affect this pro-
tected species or its habitat, the VA requested consultation with the
Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior.' 71 Pend-
ing this consultation, the VA "determined not to issue final approvals
on any of the units . . . [and] not to guaranty any loans for the
purchase of newly constructed homes or for the construction of homes
in the affected area."172 In October 1978, the San Diego VA office in-
formed the developer of the presence of the mesa mint. The developer
immediately graded the ungraded lots, thereby destroying the mesa
mint. 17
3
In December, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a biological
opinion pursuant to ESA.174 The Service found that vernal pools, the
habitat of mesa mint, had been present over much of the developer's
land and that the brushing and grading had resulted in the loss of ap-
proximately one third of the species' total habitat. 75 The Service
stated that the VA had therefore been negligent in its section 7 responsi-
bilities "by not taking appropriate steps to prevent an irreversible and
irretrievable commitment of resources on the project site."' 176 Thus, be-
cause of the developer's actions, the Service was precluded from recom-
mending reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action as
169. 43 Fed. Reg. 44,812 (1978).
170. Id
171. A division of the Department of the Interior, the Fish and Wildlife Service, is re-
sponsible for protected species that live on land or in the air. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1980).
172. Letter from John G. Miller, Director of the Regional Office of the Veterans Admin-
istration in Los Angeles, California, to Kahler Martinson, Regional Director of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service in Portland, Oregon, at 2 (Oct. 25, 1978).
173. Official biological opinion of the Department of Interior, and appendix, contained
in a letter from William A. Meyer, Acting Director of the Regional Office of the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service in Portland, Oregon, to John G. Miller, Director of the
Regional Office of the Veterans Administration, in Los Angeles, California, at 4 (Dec. 28,
1978).
174. Id. at 1.
175. Id at 4.
176. Id
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provided for by ESA. 1
77
After the biological opinion was rendered, the developer withdrew
its request for loan guarantee eligibility. 78 It subsequently renewed its
request for a determination of eligibility for part of the development.
In response to the new request, the VA again asked the Fish and Wild-
life Service to identify protected species on the property. The Fish and
Wildlife Service responded that there were no protected species on the
property. 179 The developer had destroyed them. 180 Thus, the VA
agreed to insure this part of the development.
181
The Fish and Wildlife Service apparently recognized an exemp-
tion not provided for in ESA. It appears to have concluded that the VA
is not violating ESA if it guarantees loans on a project in which the
protected species has been wilfully destroyed, provided that the species
is destroyed before the loan guarantee commitment is actually made.
Nothing in the Act, however, suggests Congress anticipated or provided
for such an exemption. If a developer knowingly destroys a listed spe-
cies in an effort to avoid ESA, the VA and HUD should refuse to guar-
antee loans for the developer's project.
Technically, the developer, not the VA, irreversibly committed re-
sources before the biological opinion was rendered. If the VA en-
couraged this type of behavior by guaranteeing loans under these
conditions, however, it would be unable to ensure that its program did
not jeopardize the continued existence of a protected species. At a min-
imum, once the consultation process has begun, section 7's prohibition
against the commitment of irreversible and irretrievable resources
should become effective. 182
177. Id
178. Letter from C.S. DeLette, Assistant Vice President, Pardee Construction Company,
to Jack Dweck, Loan Guaranty Officer, Veterans Administration, Los Angeles, California
(Aug. 3, 1979).
179. Letter from William Sweeney, Area Manager, Fish and Wildlife Service, Depart-
ment of the Interior, Area Office in Sacramento, California, to Jack Dweck, Acting Director,
Veterans Administration, Los Angeles, California (June 23, 1980).
180. See official biological opinion of the Department of the Interior, and appendix,
contained in letter from William A. Meyer, Acting Director of the Regional Office of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service at Portland, Oregon, to John G. Miller, Director of
the Regional Office of the Veterans Administration, in Los Angeles, California, at 4 (Dec.
28, 1978).
181. Letter from C.R. Schmidt, Acting Loan Guaranty Officer, Veterans Administra-
tion, to Katharine Rosenberry (July 16, 1981). HUD did, however, refuse to guarantee the
loans for these units. Letter from Donald C. Lamke, Supervisor of the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development Service Office, in San Diego, California, to David E. Landon,
Executive Vice President of Pardee Construction Company (Feb. 5, 1979).
182. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. 1m 1979). When presented with a similar situation, the
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A federal agency guaranteeing loans for construction should thus
be controlled by ESA. First, although loan guarantee programs only
indirectly affect housing construction, regulations state that ESA con-
trols federal actions that indirectly affect land. Second, in the only
published decision involving a loan guarantee, the court in Nebraska v.
REA assumed federal loan guarantee programs are subject to ESA.
Third, both NEPA and the NHPA apply to loan guarantee programs.
Finally, both HUD and the VA have assumed that the Act applies to
their loan guarantee programs. Therefore, no federal agency should
guarantee loans for construction or purchase of housing units without
complying with ESA.
Rulemaking by Federal Financial Institutions
Federal agencies also indirectly affect housing construction by
making rules that regulate the amount of money financial institutions
may make available for the construction and purchase of new homes.
For example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the Federal Reserve Banks control the flow and supply of real es-
tate credit.1 83 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also
may establish limits on mortgage lending and real estate investment by
member banks. 184 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal
Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC) perform similar functions through their control of
savings and loan associations.1
85
These institutions are agencies or "authorities" of the federal gov-
ernment. 86 They make rules that indirectly affect construction of new
dwelling units; consequently, all these rules potentially can affect pro-
tected species. Therefore, it is necessary to determine if there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the rulemaking powers of these agencies and ESA
for one to conclude that these agencies must make rules forcing
financial institutions under their control to comply with ESA.
Regulations under ESA specifically provide that the promulgation
of regulations by federal agencies falls within ESA.187 Furthermore,
court in North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980), concluded that
"[a]ny other interpretation would defeat the legislative purposes underlying the amendments
to the Endangered Species Act, and undermine the effectiveness of the Endangered Species
Committee." Id at 355 (footnote omitted). See note 92 supra.
183. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
184. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
185. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
186. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522, 1461-1470, 1811-1832 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
187. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1980).
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the courts have concluded that the promulgation of rules by federal
agencies is governed by ESA.188 These courts, however, considered
hunting regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior
that directly affected an endangered species. No published decision has
considered application of the Act to a rulemaking process that only
indirectly affects a protected species, and no published decision has ad-
dressed ESA's effect on actions by any of these financial agencies.189
Rule promulgation by a federal agency was involved in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,190 in which the plaintiffs al-
leged that NEPA required the Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to promulgate rules requiring comprehensive disclosures by cor-
porations of their environmental policies. 191 The court concluded that
NEPA made environmental considerations part of the SEC's mandate
and that NEPA applied to the SEC's rulemaking procedures. It also
concluded, however, that NEPA did not require the SEC to promulgate
specific rules. Instead, NEPA merely required the SEC to consider al-
ternatives and to consult with the Council on Environmental Quality.
While NEPA merely requires an agency to consider alternatives to
188. Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). See notes 44-48 & accompanying text supra.
189. The Federal Reserve Bank and the FDIC were involved in two cases brought under
NEPA and NHPA, although neither case involved rulemaking. In Committee to Save the
Fox Building v. Birmingham Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 497 F. Supp.
504 (D. Ala. 1980), the FederaL Reserve Bank gave a Regional Federal Reserve Bank per-
mission to acquire property for expansion. This expansion would require the destruction of
buildings located on the property. After a demolition permit was obtained and funds for
demolition allocated, a building located on the property was designated as an historic struc-
ture on the National Register of Historic Places. The court held that the Federal Reserve
Bank and the Regional Federal Reserve Bank were federal agencies and thus were bound by
both NEPA and the NHPA. 1d at 509-10. This case might have limited application, how-
ever, because the challenged action directly affected a registered site and was in the nature of
a licensing procedure rather than a rulemaking procedure. The court did not decide that all
rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve Bank must comply with NEPA and NHPA.
The court was also faced with a request to relocate a bank in Edwards v. First Bank of
Dundee, 534 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976). A state bank sought permission from the FDIC to
relocate to property located in an historic district listed on the National Register of Historic
Places. Relocation required the destruction of a building in the historic district. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the project must be enjoined because the FDIC was required first to prepare
an EIS pursuant to NEPA and to obtain an opinion by the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that there was no federal involve-
ment in the demolition. The project was not federally funded and no federal officer was
joined as a party defendant. Finally, the FDIC had no control over the demolition of the
structure. Therefore, the court held that NEPA did not apply to the FDIC under these facts.
190. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
191. Id at 1036-37. The plaintiffs wanted all corporations that filed with the SEC to
disclose the environmental impact of their activities and any plans the corporations had to
remedy the adverse impacts.
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a proposed agency action, ESA may prohibit the proposed action. This
difference arises from the distinction between the two acts:
NEPA essentially imposes a procedural requirement on agencies, re-
quiring them to engage in an extensive inquiry as to the effect of fed-
eral action on the environment; by way of contrast, the Act [ESA] is
substantive in effect, designed toprevent the loss of any endangered
species, regardless of the cost.
192
Thus, if ESA is deemed to apply to a particular agency's rulemaking
process, the agency should be required to make rules ensuring that its
actions will not jeopardize the continued existence of a protected spe-
cies and will not adversely modify a critical habitat. ESA and its legis-
lative history do not suggest, however, that federal financial institutions
should be required to make rules ensuring that their actions do not
jeopardize a protected species.
Both the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and the
Supreme Court of the United States have acknowledged that NEPA
and ESA apply to agencies who have a primary purpose other than the
protection of the environment. In Natural Resources, the court stated
that NEPA applied to the SEC although "environmental concerns to
some extent run counter to the SEC's primary mandate of financial
protection of investors."1 93 Similarly, in TVA v. Hill the Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he legislative history undergirding § 7 reveals an explicit congres-
sional decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the de-
clared national policy of saving endangered species. The pointed
omission of the type of qualifying language previously included in
endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by Con-
gress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions'
of federal agencies.19
4
These statements suggest that ESA should apply to all rules promul-
gated by federal agencies, and that the Federal Reserve Bank, the
FDIC, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the FSLIC should
promulgate rules prohibiting banks under their control from loaning
money to a developer who would jeopardize a listed species or critical
habitat. Only by prohibiting these transactions could the financial
agencies ensure that their actions would conserve, and not jeopardize,
species.
In enacting ESA, however, Congress probably did not intend to
govern federal financial agencies. Although the SEC was bound by
192. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 n.34 (1978) (emphasis in original).
193. 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
194. 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
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NEPA in Natural Resources, this conclusion is justified because the
SEC's own disclosure rules facilitate NEPA's aims. The SEC is able to
evaluate a corporation's compliance with disclosure law, including en-
vironmental disclosure law. In contrast, the federal financial agencies
do not control the type of projects for which loans can be made and are
not set up to review the merits of each loan. In enacting ESA, Congress
must have been fully aware that the federal financial agencies do not
evaluate each loan made by its various members. Had Congress in-
tended the ESA to apply to these agencies, it undoubtedly would have
mentioned them specifically.
Furthermore, although in TVA the Supreme Court stated that
Congress intended to give endangered species priority over the primary
missions of federal agencies, the only agencies to which the Court re-
ferred were agencies whose actions directly affect endangered spe-
cies. 195 The Court's discussion of the legislative history of ESA further
indicates that it included only agencies whose effect on protected spe-
cies was direct. In discussing hearing testimony, it stated, "Witnesses
recommended, among other things, that Congress requires all land-
managing agencies 'to avoid damaging critical habitat for endangered
species and to take positive steps to improve such habitat.' "196 The
Court apparently did not consider agencies such as the Federal Reserve
Banks or the FDIC.
Therefore, while ESA does apply to the promulgation of rules by
federal agencies, it is unlikely that a court would apply ESA to the
promulgation of rules by federal financial agencies. The rules promul-
gated by these financial agencies do not directly affect endangered spe-
cies. Neither the Federal Reserve Act, the Homeowner's Bank Act, or
the history of ESA indicate that Congress intended these agencies to
control the kind of projects for which loans can be made.
Conclusion
If the Endangered Species Act is applied to all federal agencies
that authorize, fund, in whole or in part, and guarantee loans for con-
struction or purchase of dwelling units, ESA's effect on the housing
195. For example, the Court referred to testimony regarding the Air Force bombing
affecting whooping cranes, id at 183, and the obligation of the Director of the Park Service
to alter forestry practices to protect the habitat of the grizzly bear, id at 187.
196. Id at 179 (emphasis added) (quoting Hearings on H. 37 Before the Subcommt on
Fisheries and Wildlfe Conservation and the Environment, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (state-
ment of A. Gene Gazlay, Director, Michigan Department of Natural Resources; Chairman,
Legislative Committee, International Association of Game, Fish and Conservation)).
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market could be substantial. Approximately 205 animals and 60 plants
are presently protected by ESA. Protected animals can be found in
almost every state, with some states, such as California, having as many
as 36.197 Protected plants can be found in approximately one-half of
the states. ESA, therefore, potentially could affect construction in al-
most every state in the Union.
Section 7 of the Act regulates federal agencies' actions that affect a
protected species. The scope of its authority has not yet been deline-
ated by the courts. When one considers, however, that over twenty-five
percent of housing construction is "authorized, funded or carried out"
by federal agencies and additional construction is regulated indirectly
by federal agencies, section 7 appears capable of reaching a great many
housing developments. Only future interpretation of the Act will deter-
mine its breadth.
197. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12, 222.23, 227.4 (1980).
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